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Abstract Causal decision theory (CDT) is one of our most prominent theories of
rational choice and the “why ain’cha rich?” argument (WAR) is one of the most
prominent objections to this theory. According toWAR, CDT is not an adequate theory
of rational choice because it leads agents tomake decisions that foreseeably leave them
less well off than agents that decide in some other manner. Some philosophers take
WAR to decisively undermine CDT. On the other hand, others (including David Lewis
and Terry Horgan) take WAR to fail to resolve the debate over CDT’s adequacy. In
this paper, I will defend this second view: WAR does not resolve the debate at hand
but instead leads to deadlock. Then, in the second half of this paper, I will show
that this deadlock is not broken by a recent variant on WAR due to Caspar Hare and
Brian Hedden. Not only does this result have implications for the debate over CDT’s
adequacy but this discussion also casts light on the broader success/rationality link.
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1 Introduction
It is clear that practical rationality and success are closely linked: a practically rational
agent will be more successful than a practically irrational agent in a wide range of
circumstances. However, it is also clear that one cannot always infer from an agent’s
success that this agent acted rationally (for example, the fact that an agent happens to
win the lottery doesn’t entail that she was rational to play it). Consequently, success-
based arguments for the rationality of a decision sometimes fail.
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With this in mind, in this paper I will consider a controversial success-based argu-
ment: the “why ain’cha rich?” argument (WAR) against causal decision theory (CDT),
one of ourmost prominent theories of rational choice. On one view, this argument deci-
sively undermines CDT (cf. Ahmed 2014, p. 130). However, on another view, WAR
leads to deadlock because it isn’t neutral with regard to the issue at hand and so can’t
resolve disagreement over CDT’s adequacy.1 Lewis (1981, p. 378), a proponent of
CDT, described the situation as a “standoff”. Meanwhile Horgan (1985, p. 229), an
opponent of CDT, described it as a “stalemate”.2
In the first half of this paper, I will argue in favour of the deadlock view. Then, in
the second half, I will show that this deadlock is not overturned by an argument due to
Hare and Hedden (2016). Not only do these results provide insight into WAR but they
also cast broader light on what it would take to run a success-based argument against
a theory of choice.
2 WAR and the standard debate
Start with Newcomb’s problem:
An agent is faced with a transparent box containing $1000 and an opaque box
containing either $1,000,000 or nothing. She may either two-box (take both
boxes) or one-box (take just the opaque box). However, she knows that these
boxes were filled the previous day by a predictor of her behaviour with a 99%
accuracy rate3: if this being predicted that the agent would one-box, it placed
$1,000,000 in the opaque box. Otherwise, it left this box empty.
In relation to this scenario, one prominent position holds that two-boxing is ratio-
nally required. After all, regardless of how the opaque box is filled the agent ends up
$1000 better off if she two-boxes than if she one-boxes (as she gains the $1000 from
the transparent box, as well as whatever is in the opaque box).
However, WAR targets this two-boxing position, as follows4:
(P1) Agents that one-box in Newcomb’s problem end up, on average, with
$990,000.
(P2) Agents that two-box in Newcomb’s problem end up, on average, with
$10,990 (that is, with 0.99 ∗ 1000 + 0.01 ∗ 1,000,000).
Therefore
(P3) Agents that one-box end up, on average, far richer than agents that two-box.
(P4) The agent facing Newcomb’s problem knows this before making her deci-
sion.
1 This is distinct from a descriptive deadlock on which WAR doesn’t (rather than shouldn’t) resolve
disagreement.
2 Horgan doesn’t explicitly mention WAR but clearly thinks it leads to stalemate (see his note 4).
3 That is, the probability that this predictor predicts that the agent will make each decision conditional on
the agent actually making that very decision is 0.99.
4 For simplicity, I speak as if agents care only (and linearly) about wealth. In note 11, I discuss a version
of this argument framed in terms of the expected return to decisions (rather than the return to agents).
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Therefore
(C) It is irrational for this agent to two-box.
Or, less formally, the argument goes: “Hey two-boxer, if you’re so smart, why
ain’cha rich?”
This argument can then be extended to undermine not just two-boxing as a decision
but also CDT as a theory of choice. After all, CDT endorses two-boxing and so
if this decision is not rationally permissible then CDT gives flawed guidance. To
see that CDT provides this guidance, note that this theory takes a decision to be
rationally required if (speaking loosely) it has a better expected causal impact than all
alternative decisions (see Joyce 1999 for formal details). Further, two-boxing has the
best expected causal impact in Newcomb’s problem, as only this decision causes the
agent to receive the $1000 in the transparent box and this is the only relevant causal
effect (as the agent receives the contents of the opaque box regardless of her decision
and she has no influence on the contents of this box as it was filled on the previous
day).5 Consequently, CDT labels two-boxing as rationally required and so if WAR
establishes this decision’s impermissibility then CDT is flawed.6
3 A bad argument for CDT
Lewis and Horgan thought that WAR failed to provide a neutral way into the debate
about CDT’s adequacy. In the next two sections, I will argue in favour of this view. I
begin with a detour via an argument for CDT (the problem with this argument illu-
minates the problem with WAR). This argument starts by noting that a pre-theoretic
notion of difference making is closely (perhaps analytically) connected to our concept
of practical rationality. For example, we appeal to this notion when we advise a friend
not to do something because it won’t make a difference (or, contrariwise, when we
advise her to do something because it will make a big difference). We also appeal to
this notion using various other phrases as, for example, whenwe talk about influencing
or shaping or changing things. In all of these cases, we accept that what we rationally
ought to do depends on the difference that our decisions make. With the notion of
difference making in mind, an argument for CDT can proceed by suggesting that dif-
ferencemaking should be analysed in terms of causation or counterfactual dependence
and noting that this gives us grounds to accept CDT (as this theory is formalised in
some variants in causal terms and in other variants in counterfactual terms).
However, this is a bad argument. After all, if it is to be common ground that differ-
ence making is connected to rationality then the central dispute in decision theory just
is a dispute about how we should analyse this notion. Speaking loosely, the proponent
of CDT thinks this notion should be analysed in causal terms (roughly: Amakes a dif-
ference to B if A causes B to be more likely to occur). Contra this, and again speaking
loosely, a prominent class of CDT’s opponents think that difference making should be
analysed in evidential terms (roughly: A makes a difference to B if A provides evi-
5 Newcomb’s problem is stipulated to not involve backward causation.
6 For the most part, I set aside as irrelevant for my purposes various responses to WAR (cf. Gibbard and
Harper 1978, p. 153; Joyce 1999, pp. 151–154; Arntzenius 2008, pp. 289–290). However, see also note 12.
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dence that B is the case).7 To simply assume, then, in arguing for CDT, that difference
making should be analysed in causal terms is effectively to assume CDT’s correctness
from the outset. It is for this reason that the provided argument is problematic.
4 Success and rationality
Myclaimwill be thatWAR is similarly problematic:WAR is not neutralwith regards to
the analysis of differencemaking and sounderminesCDTonly ifwe effectively assume
CDT’s falsity from the outset. “Deadlock”, says this paper’s author; “Standoff”, says
Lewis; “Stalemate”, says Horgan.
4.1 A problem for the success/rationality link
As a first step toward this conclusion, take another diversion and imagine that each
member of a group made up of black-haired people and blonde-haired people faces
a decision scenario. In this scenario, each person (who knows her own hair colour)
can choose to press a button labelled black or a button labelled blonde. If the person
presses the button associated with her hair colour, she receives: (a) $1,000,000 if she
has black hair; and (b) $100 if she has blonde hair. If the person presses the button not
associated with her hair colour, she receives nothing.
Now, if we imagine that 99% of both black and blonde-haired people press the
button associated with their hair colour, then those who press black receive an average
of $990,000 and those that press blonde receive an average of $99. From the compar-
ative richness of the two groups, we might conclude that pressing black is rationally
required here and hence conclude that the blonde-haired people who pressed blonde
acted irrationally. Clearly, however, this conclusion is false (given that blonde-haired
people receive a payout only if they press blonde). Consideration of average success
has led us astray.8 What is needed, then, is a criterion for when such considerations
reflect the rationality or irrationality of the associated decisions. Fortunately, such
criteria are easy enough to come by (the interesting question will be what they reveal
about WAR).
4.2 Problems for WAR
Here’s a clue as to how we might develop such a criterion: the unfairness of the
above comparison results from the fact that, in the case at hand, black-haired people
face more advantageous circumstances than blonde-haired people do (they have the
7 Perhaps our ordinary concept of difference making is inherently causal. If so, my usage in this paper
should be seen as stipulative (with this phrase being stipulated to neutrally pick out the relation between
decision and world that is relevant to rational choice). The problem with the above argument will then be
even more clear: too much is being read into our ordinary usage of a stipulative phrase (and circularity will
occur once more if difference making is assumed to be causal in nature).
8 Note that, unlike in Newcomb’s problem, proponents of CDT and CDT’s chief rival (evidential decision
theory, or EDT) will agree about rationality in this case. In particular, both groups will agree that blonde-
haired people ought to press the blonde button. This is what allows the case to be used to demonstrate that
naive appeals to success considerations will sometimes be problematic, while remaining neutral between
EDT and CDT.
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opportunity to make $1,000,000 while blonde-haired people have the opportunity to
make just $100). Combined with the fact that most of the black-haired people choose
black (and most the blonde-haired people choose blonde), this means that the positive
returns to agents that chose black partially result from these desirable circumstances
(rather than from the decision). As such, it is problematic to read from this success to
the rationality of the associated decision.
This suggest a necessary criterion for when such comparisons reveal decision ratio-
nality (a criterion that is neutral, insofar as it appeals to difference making but leaves
open the analysis of this notion)9:
fair: A comparison of the return to agents reflects the rationality of the decisions
made by these agents (and hence is a fair comparison) only if the circumstances
of all agents are the same with regards to everything except: (a) the agent’s
decision; and (b) those things that the agent’s decision makes a difference to.10
fair is not met in the hair-colour case as the agents making each decision differ in
terms of (the distribution of) their hair colour and, in this case, an agent’s hair colour
is neither one of her decisions nor something that her decisions make a difference to.
As such, fair resolves the problem here.
However, given this criterion, WAR leads to deadlock. After all, whether or not
WARsucceeds nowdepends onwhether or not a comparison of all two-boxers and one-
boxers satisfies fair. However, this criterion won’t be satisfied if difference making is
analysed causally. After all, the circumstances of one-boxers and two-boxers typically
differs in terms of the opaque box’s contents and the agent’s decision does not make a
difference to these contents in the relevant sense (the agent cannot causally influence
these contents). Consequently, if we accept fair and the account of difference making
associated with CDT then WAR fails. Given fair, then, for WAR to succeed we must
reject this account of difference making and so must effectively assume CDT’s falsity
up front.11 It follows that WAR is problematic in just the way that the above argument
for CDT was problematic. We are left with deadlock: WAR isn’t neutral with regards
to CDT’s truth and so doesn’t resolve disagreements about CDT’s adequacy.12
9 Note that this criterion is necessary but not sufficient and so there are other criteria that will need to be
satisfied if a comparison of agent success is to be illuminating (for example, the beliefs of the agents facing
the scenario will have to be accurate in a certain sense and, perhaps following from this, the agents being
compared will need to have relevantly similar beliefs). Note also that my argument will proceed by appeal
to the following criteria but could be adapted to views on which success is revealed by comparing: (i) a
restricted class of agents; (ii) just some of the reward received by agents; or (iii) just agents that face the
same scenario.
10 This can be weakened as: (1) it need only be that the proportion of agents facing certain circumstances
is the same in each group being compared; and (2) these circumstances need only be identical in terms of
those things that make a difference to the agent’s payoff.
11 If WAR is stated in terms of expected returns to decisions (rather than agent comparisons) problems
still arise as either: (1) expected returns involve implicit agent comparisons anyway (if expected returns are
evaluated in terms of average returns to agents); or (2) expected returns are weighted sums and WAR is
again problematically circular as the debate over CDT’s adequacy just is a debate about which such sum is
relevant to rationality.
12 The responses in note 6 might seem to break this deadlock in favour of CDT. However, these responses
are ill suited for the purpose of breaking deadlock as they rely on premises that the opponent of CDT
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Table 1 Houdini’s challenge
Predicted A Predicted B Predicted C
Crate A $1,000,000 $0 $0
Crate B $1,001,000 $0 $0
Crate C $0 $1000 $0
5 An argument to the contrary
However, a recent paper by Hare and Hedden (2016) claims to undermine this dead-
lock. In particular, Hare and Hedden agree that WAR leads to deadlock but claim to
have found a similar success-based argument against CDT that avoids deadlock. How-
ever, in the remainder of this paper, I will argue that Hare and Hedden are mistaken.
Deadlock is not so easily avoided.
5.1 The argument
Hare and Hedden’s argument starts from a decision scenario that I will dub Houdini’s
challenge and present as follows:
Houdini, who can perfectly predict your behaviour, fills three crates (A, B and
C) with money on the basis of his prediction of your choice in this very scenario
(in accordance with Table 1).13 He then offers you the choice of any one crate.
By appeal to this scenario, Hare and Hedden then present an objection to CDT:
(P1) A self-aware, epistemically and practically-rational agent (hereafter, SEPA)
will not choose C in Houdini’s challenge.
(P2) If CDT is true then a SEPA will choose C in Houdini’s challenge.
Therefore
(C) CDT is false.
In relation to this objection, Hare and Hedden argue for (P2) by iterated elimination
of weakly-dominated strategies. That is, they first note that if CDT is true then a SEPA
should be certain that she won’t choose A, as this decision pays out less than choosing
B if Houdini predicted A and pays out the same amount as choosing B otherwise (that
is, choosing B dominates choosing A and so a SEPA will not choose A rather than
Footnote 12 continued
denies (and so don’t progress the debate). Further, there are some grounds to think that these responses
rely on an up-front, hidden rejection of the version of fair accepted by the opponent of CDT. If so then
these arguments will beg the question against CDT’s opponents in just the way that WAR begs the question
against CDT itself. In any case, providing a detailed analysis of every possible line of argument here is
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will rest content with establishing a default deadlock that will be
overturned only given a substantive argument that pays close attention to any hidden assumptions about
fair.
13 To say that Houdini can perfectly predict your behaviour is to say that your credence that Houdini
predicted a certain choice, conditional on the assumption that you make that very choice, is 1.
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B).14 However, once the SEPA becomes certain that she won’t choose A, she should
also become certain that Houdini won’t have predicted A as Houdini always predicts
correctly. Then, given this new belief, the SEPA should now be certain that she won’t
choose B. After all, setting aside the possibility that Houdini predicted A, choosing
C pays out more than choosing B if Houdini predicted B and the same amount if he
predicted C (that is, choosing C now dominates choosing B and so a SEPA will not
choose B rather than C). Having eliminated the possibility of choosing A or B, the
SEPA is now certain that she will choose C and, it is argued, a SEPA will not surprise
herself and so will choose C.15 (P2) has been established.
In the discussion to follow, I will assume for the sake of argument that this argument
for (P2) succeeds. Consequently, it is to (P1) that I turn.
5.2 WAR again/deadlock again
Hare and Hedden support (P1) by appeal to a variant on WAR.16 This argument is
simple enough: agents that choose A end up, on average, with $1,000,000 while agents
that choose C end up, on average, with $0. Therefore, it might be asked of the agents
that took C, “if you’re so smart, why ain’cha rich?” Or, less colloquially, it might be
claimed that the comparative success of agents that chose A over agents that chose
C entails that taking C is not rationally permissible (and hence that a SEPA will not
take C).
This argument is, of course, nearly identical to WAR: it differs only in that the
same reasoning is applied to a different scenario. Consequently, it might be unclear
how this argument could avoid deadlock. To answer this question, I will first outline
Hare and Hedden’s diagnosis of why deadlock results in the original WAR argument
(using the terminology of the current paper, rather than Hare and Hedden’s original
terminology). Here, Hare and Hedden’s starting point is largely the same as my own:
fair.17 In particular: (a) let c-fair refer to a causal version of fair (on which the
appeal to difference making is replaced with an appeal to the causal effects of the
decision); and (b) let e- fair refer to the evidential version of fair (on which the
appeal to difference making is replaced with an appeal to the evidence provided by
the decision). With this terminology in mind, Hare and Hedden take WAR to lead to
deadlock because two-boxing is more successful than one-boxing by the comparison
14 This reasoning relies for legitimacy on the truth of CDT, which claims that this sort of dominance
reasoning is legitimate if Houdini’s prediction is causally independent of the SEPA’s decision (which it
is). On another view, this dominance reasoning would be legitimate only if the SEPA’s decision provided
no evidence about Houdini’s prediction (which isn’t the case and so the dominance reasoning would be
illegitimate).
15 Note that this argument succeeds only if the SEPA is certain that Houdini’s predictions are perfect
(this weakens the argument in various ways: for example, it means that it would not withstand a move to
imprecise credences).
16 Hare and Hedden also support (P1) by appeal to intuition but I set this issue aside (my interest is in
WAR).
17 Rather than explicitly appealing to fair, Hare and Hedden require relevant similarity of cases and take
the question of what factors make for such similarity to be what’s at stake. The differences in their account
are not important for my purposes.
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that is appropriate according to c-fair18 and yet one-boxing is more successful than
two-boxing by the comparison that is appropriate according to e- fair.19
Half of the comparable result also holds in Houdini’s challenge: here, if we rely
on e- fair then choosing C is less successful than choosing A.20 But the other half of
the result does not hold: if we rely on c-fair then it’s not the case that choosing C is
more successful than choosing A (rather, these two decisions are equally successful).
After all, c-fair requires us to hold fixed the emptiness of all three crates (when
evaluating agents that choose C, as these agents are faced with empty crates and can’t
causally influence their contents). Such agents receive no money regardless of their
decision and so all choices are equally successful.21 So Houdini’s challenge is unlike
Newcomb’s problem: in Houdini’s challenge, it is not the case that each decision is
more successful than the other according to one of the comparisons at hand (rather,
C is merely equally successful to A on one of these comparisons). “No stalemate”,
conclude Hedden and Hare.
However, this conclusion is false. After all, contra Hedden and Hare,WAR does not
lead to deadlock as a result of one version of fair leading us to label two-boxing as
more successful than one-boxing and another leading us to label one-boxing as more
successful than two-boxing. Rather, WAR leads to deadlock because it is not neutral
with regards to the correct analysis of difference making and hence undermines CDT
only if CDT’s falsity is effectively assumed from the outset. To put this another way:
WAR leads to deadlock because two-boxing is problematic only if we reject c-fair
and so only if we effectively reject CDT up front (because rejecting c-fair is plausible
only if we reject a causal account of difference making but rejecting such an account
is to effectively reject CDT).
With this in mind, we can turn back to Hare and Hedden’s variant on WAR. Here,
deadlock arises once again. After all, as noted above, choosing C is not less successful
than the alternative decisions if we accept c-fair and so this claim needs to be rejected
upfront if the variant onWAR is to succeed. However, to reject this claim is effectively
to reject CDT and so this variant on WAR succeeds only if we assume from the outset
the conclusion that it sets out to establish. This alone is enough to lead to deadlock,with
no need for choosing C to be more successful than the alternatives if c-fair holds.22
18 This criterion requires that the compared agents face the same box contents (as the agent’s decision can’t
causally influence these). Amongst such agents, the two-boxers gain the same reward from the opaque box
as the one-boxers but also, unlike the one-boxers, gain $1000 from the transparent box and so end up richer.
19 Because this criterion allows the opaque box’s contents to vary we can run the original WAR argument.
20 After all, this criterion allows the contents of the crates to vary and so allowsHare andHedden’s variation
on WAR to proceed.
21 Note that Hare and Hedden also compare agents who find the crates filled as agents that choose A find
them filled. However, this comparison is irrelevant as CDT only recommends that agents choose C if they
don’t believe they’re in the situation facing agents that choose A (and nothing can be concluded about
subjective rationality from comparisons of agents with false beliefs of this sort). Note also that, if CDT is
correct, then a SEPA always chooses C, despite the equal success of all decisions but this is unproblematic:
there is no problem with choosing consistently given a draw.
22 Hare and Hedden (2016, p. 626) also claim that problems arise for CDT because certain counterfactuals
that hold in Newcomb’s problem don’t hold in Houdini’s challenge (for example: the counterfactual that if
the proponent of CDT had chosen as per CDT’s opponent, she would have done worse than she in fact did).
However, the proponent of CDT should deny that this fact truly poses a problem for CDT. In particular,
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“No stalemate”, conclude Hedden and Hare but their argument here fails: “Deadlock”,
says this paper’s author; “Standoff”, says Lewis; “Stalemate”, says Horgan.
6 Conclusions
At the close of the paper, here’s a careful conclusion: WAR leads to deadlock because
it succeeds only if we assume, up front, the falsity of CDT. At the close of the paper,
here’s a less careful conclusion. WAR is perhaps the pre-eminent argument in the
philosophical literature on decision theory and so the fact that WAR leads to deadlock
is not only interesting in itself but it also hints at a broader possibility: it hints at
the possibility that different theorists approach decision theory from such different
starting points that there will be no neutral way to settle the matter (that is, it raises the
possibility that difference making is so central to practical rationality that no argument
that is neutral with regards to difference making will offer a resolution of the debate).
Decision-theoretic deadlock may be inescapable.
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